A strategy-proof voting rule makes it best for voters to tell the truth.
策略无关的投票规则使选民如实表达偏好成为最佳选择。
The mechanism is strategy-proof under independent private values, but it may fail when preferences are interdependent.
在独立的私人价值假设下,该机制是策略无关的,但当偏好相互依赖时可能不再成立。
Allan Gibbard (1973), Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result(提出与“不可操纵/策略无关”密切相关的经典结果)
Mark A. Satterthwaite (1975), Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions(系统讨论 strategy-proofness 与社会选择条件)